NATO relations with Ukraine

[CalebJ]

It's interesting that you keep referring to the 'US people' and 'mainstream narrative'. But what we believe is effectively a -global- narrative, presented by numerous independent news agencies. By contrast, you're cherry picking your news from Youtube feeds and sources that are biased by definition, e.g. antiwar.com, etc.

 

[boatgeek]

Thanks for a very reasonable reply! Also, you asked a great question.

I guess the answer to the question depends upon the narrative that is our common set of assumptions. I get that 95% of the US people, government and media buy into the mainstream narrative. But I'm one of those iconoclasts who takes mavericks like Scott Ritter and Colonel Douglas Macgregor seriously. They both are published widely on YouTube and in The American Conservative (I've been a subscriber for 20 years). So these guys have convinced me that lots of things have changed since the initial weeks of the invasion, particularly that naive Russian expectations of a quick capitulation or negotiation were firmly dashed by a heavy dose of reality - by how well prepared and equipped the Ukraines were. But to appreciate all the details, I refer you to the voluminous works of Col Macgregor and Scott Ritter.

Can you provide a link to a relatively concise video or non-paywalled article that describes what has changed?

With regard to the 4th possibility you mention, I agree it's possible, even desirable for 95% of us, or all of us if it can prevent widening into WW3. But I think it would entail NATO - at least the US - jumping in with massive external force such as a no-fly zone and US boots on the front lines. Like Joint Chief of Staff General Milley said to Biden and in the NY Times, the Ukrainians have done all that can be expected of them. He implied it was time to negotiate. Either that or a lot more help on the ground.

I don't think that a no-fly zone or US boots on the ground are at all necessary for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Why? Because Ukraine liberated two major swathes of territory without either, just this summer. It is not unreasonable to look at the current situation around Svatove and Kreminna and see parallels to the Kharkiv offensive. Likewise, the Kherson offensive is a template for retaking Melitopol. If both of those cities are taken, Russian logistics become extremely difficult.

 

[PhilC]

Can you provide a link to a relatively concise video or non-paywalled article that describes what has changed?

I don't think that a no-fly zone or US boots on the ground are at all necessary for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Why? Because Ukraine liberated two major swathes of territory without either, just this summer. It is not unreasonable to look at the current situation around Svatove and Kreminna and see parallels to the Kharkiv offensive. Likewise, the Kherson offensive is a template for retaking Melitopol. If both of those cities are taken, Russian logistics become extremely difficult.

I think I'd go further and say that a no-fly zone or any non-Ukranian boots on the ground would be highly dangerous. Imagine a NATO plane shooting down a Russian plane, or NATO troops in combat with Russians; it would play right into Putin's false narrative that NATO is attacking Russia. Notwithstanding the propaganda coup, this could (in his warped reality) be grounds for further escalation.
This needs to remain Ukraine's fight. We need to limit ourselves to arming them, training them and financing them.

 

[Dotini]

Can you provide a link to a relatively concise video or non-paywalled article that describes what has changed?

I don't think that a no-fly zone or US boots on the ground are at all necessary for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Why? Because Ukraine liberated two major swathes of territory without either, just this summer. It is not unreasonable to look at the current situation around Svatove and Kreminna and see parallels to the Kharkiv offensive. Likewise, the Kherson offensive is a template for retaking Melitopol. If both of those cities are taken, Russian logistics become extremely difficult.

If you go to his you tube channel, you can find a very wide range of his interviews to choose from, some shorter than 10 minutes. The one I attach here is longer, but you can skip the 4 minutes of intro.

I think I'd go further and say that a no-fly zone or any non-Ukranian boots on the ground would be highly dangerous. Imagine a NATO plane shooting down a Russian plane, or NATO troops in combat with Russians; it would play right into Putin's false narrative that NATO is attacking Russia. Notwithstanding the propaganda coup, this could (in his warped reality) be grounds for further escalation.
This needs to remain Ukraine's fight. We need to limit ourselves to arming them, training them and financing them.

Completely agreed. Further escalation is highly dangerous and to be avoided. But the question was @boatgeek 's 4th option, a quick Ukrainian victory. As we will see, it's a long shot that's getting longer. At least a yearlong stalemate according to the NYT, cease fire negotiations based on a return to Feb 24 lines, and a major Russian offensive are the other three.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

Recently the New York Times has published its opinion that the war has entered a prolonged stalemate phase, potentially lasting through the coming year.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/21/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-stalemate.html
Elsewhere, leaders such as Macron, Scholtz, Boris Johnson, Anthony Blinken, Admiral Mike Mullen and Henry Kissinger have surprisingly hinted or even openly suggested the February 24th borders could be the basis for a cease fire and peace deal.

https://original.antiwar.com/Ted_Snider/2022/12/22/five-statements-that-could-change-the-war/
But there is another view that the war will be settled decisively in the coming weeks and months by a massive Russian offensive. Scott Ritter and Col. Douglas Macgregor have published extensively on this possibility.

It is possible the war could enter a stalemate phase. That’s definitely possible if the winter is spent with both sides shoring up defensive positions, and neither side aggressively takes the initiative.

It’s also possible Ukraine could win quickly by attacking during the winter before Russia has time to shore up defenses, train its troop replacements, restock supplies, and regroup. Ukraine had the momentum and initiative before winter set in, and I think it’s important they keep that upper hand. If that’s the outcome we want, we need to get them the vehicles, armor, and ammo they will need ASAP.

I don’t think Russia will be able to regenerate its strength to the point they can press forward any time soon. Maybe if they have a few years they could attack again, but not soon. At this point they are taking a defensive posture. According to the article, the one and only place they are still pressing an attack, Bakhmut, is about securing more defensible positions and defending past gains, not about taking large amounts of new territory.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

Completely agreed. Further escalation is highly dangerous and to be avoided. But the question was @boatgeek 's 4th option, a quick Ukrainian victory. As we will see, it's a long shot that's getting longer. At least a yearlong stalemate according to the NYT, cease fire negotiations based on a return to Feb 24 lines, and a major Russian offensive are the other three.

You’re reading things into the NYT article that are not there. Nowhere in that article does it say there will be “At least a yearlong stalemate”.

A stalemate is possible. A negotiated peace is possible. A Ukrainian victory is possible. And a Russian victory is possible. Anything is possible, and wars are unpredictable. But I think you can work through the possibilities and see which ones are more likely than others.

The negotiated peace is not going to happen until one of the other 3 possibilities for a military outcome occurs. If one side or the other wins, they will be in a position to negotiate a favorable peace on their terms. If a prolonged stalemate occurs, the sides may choose to end active combat in some form of ceasefire. But we are a long way from that.

It seems extremely unlikely that Russia can generate enough force to win outright. They don’t have the resources, and they don’t have the will. They are not getting stronger.

I think Ukraine can win. It will take more money, equipment, ammo, etc. More aid from the US and allies. We have a lot of good reasons to want this outcome and to provide that aid, and I hope we just commit and do it as soon as possible.

And a stalemate is certainly possible, but I’d rank it as less likely than Ukraine winning outright, and more likely than Russia winning outright.

 

[Dotini]

You’re reading things into the NYT article that are not there. Nowhere in that article does it say there will be “At least a yearlong stalemate”.

A stalemate is possible. A negotiated peace is possible. A Ukrainian victory is possible. And a Russian victory is possible. Anything is possible, and wars are unpredictable. But I think you can work through the possibilities and see which ones are more likely than others.

The negotiated peace is not going to happen until one of the other 3 possibilities for a military outcome occurs. If one side or the other wins, they will be in a position to negotiate a favorable peace on their terms. If a prolonged stalemate occurs, the sides may choose to end active combat in some form of ceasefire. But we are a long way from that.

It seems extremely unlikely that Russia can generate enough force to win outright. They don’t have the resources, and they don’t have the will. They are not getting stronger.

I think Ukraine can win. It will take more money, equipment, ammo, etc. More aid from the US and allies. We have a lot of good reasons to want this outcome and to provide that aid, and I hope we just commit and do it as soon as possible.

And a stalemate is certainly possible, but I’d rank it as less likely than Ukraine winning outright, and more likely than Russia winning outright.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley has both said and written that Ukraine cannot win militarily and should negotiate while it still retains bargaining power. Yes, he has since had to retract that and toe the party line. It is widely said but not proved that NATO nations and US are depleting ammunition stores to the point where our own military readiness is adversely affected. So sure, anything is possible. A stalemate does look the most likely for at least a few weeks or maybe longer. But the constant grinding of trench warfare and destruction of infrastructure presents a grueling prospect for Europe to abide. Economic and political fractures could soon affect NATO, imho.

 

[ThirstyBarbarian]

US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley has both said and written that Ukraine cannot win militarily and should negotiate while it still retains bargaining power. Yes, he has since had to retract that and toe the party line. It is widely said but not proved that NATO nations and US are depleting ammunition stores to the point where our own military readiness is adversely affected. So sure, anything is possible. A stalemate does look the most likely for at least a few weeks or maybe longer. But the constant grinding of trench warfare and destruction of infrastructure presents a grueling prospect for Europe to abide. Economic and political fractures could soon affect NATO, imho.

Why have you revived this old thread that went dormant before the war even started to discuss this unrelated topic, instead of discussing it where it makes more sense in the “Thoughts and comments“ thread you started? I will respond to you there.

https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...urrent-russian-ukrainian-conflict-war.171175/

 

[Dotini]

Why have you revived this old thread that went dormant before the war even started to discuss this unrelated topic, instead of discussing it where it makes more sense in the “Thoughts and comments“ thread you started? I will respond to you there.

https://www.rocketryforum.com/threa...urrent-russian-ukrainian-conflict-war.171175/

I do not have reply privileges in that thread, so I obviously cannot make any replies or posts there (I caused a riot!). So I am no longer a participant in the "Thoughts and Comments" thread, although I would like to be. Forum Administrators please take note.

 

[cwbullet]

Locked thread. We do not need two Ukraine threads going at the same time.